Sunday, November 11, 2018

Post WW1

Great War’s shockwave resounded through the decades



Starvation, poverty and yet further fighting darkened the world despite the hopes of many
They called it the Great War and hoped it had changed the world. But the world was not so easily hammered into a new shape or infused with a new spirit.
On the day when the war officially ended — the 11th day of the 11th month of 1918 — the news sped to Australia along the Pacific Ocean cable. Melbourne, then the nation’s capital, received the message that Monday evening at 7.20.
There were no radio stations and most homes lacked a telephone, but the news item — initially pasted on the outside walls of the newspaper offices spread like magic. That night the cheering crowds eventually filled the main streets of every big city. Many other families stayed at home. Having lost a son or father, brother or uncle, they wondered whether it was an occasion for celebrating.
Next day, in the federal parliament, “Willy” Watt as acting prime minister honoured the more than 60,000 men who had died and then turned to the nation’s women. He wished to pay “in feeble words, a special tribute to their courage, fortitude, and self-sacrifice”. There was widespread pride in how the nation had performed.
Most members of the huge Australian army were still overseas, in France and Belgium and Palestine. Ships had to be found to bring them home but the wartime loss of shipping even in neutral nations had been enormous. General Sir John Monash, moving from the quiet battlefields to London, skilfully organised the homewards voyage for 160,000 soldiers He himself did not step ashore in his home city of Melbourne until nearly 14 months after the war had ended. Perhaps nobody in the nation was more respected.
For a time it was called the war to end war. Watt assured his parliament that Australia “for many a generation will remain a safer and a happier place to live in”. In various nations, a host of people joined peace movements or thought of joining them. When the League of Nations (forerunner of the UN) was formed in 1920, with Australia as an inaugural member, the faith was widespread that it would prevent or limit future wars.
Eventually a sobering fact became clear. The peace movement, dynamic in England but pitifully weak in Hitler’s Germany, unwittingly increased the likelihood of a second world war. In the crucial years of the 1930s, it inhibited Britain from rearming quickly at a time when Britain ought to have rearmed to confront a militant Nazi Germany.
Even the armistice of 1918 had no peaceful effects on many lands, especially during the following three years. There was fighting — virtually a civil war — in Ireland. International and civil wars broke out in Russia. Finland and Poland each fought the Russians, and the Bolsheviks and the White Russians fought each other. A small British army was shipped to the shores of the White Sea in northwest Russia. One of its soldiers was Arthur Sullivan, a shy bank clerk who, enlisting in South Australia in 1918, arrived in Europe too late to serve in the war. In the following year, fighting the Russians in a swamp near Archangel, he was awarded the Victoria Cross for an act of remarkable bravery while facing the enemy’s intense firepower.
In eastern Europe the Polish army fought the Czechs, and Romanians fought Hungarians. On the Baltic shores, little Latvia declared war on Germany. Greeks fought Turks in a deadly war in the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, and in 1922 our prime minister Billy Hughes was invited — and was tempted — to send troops from Australia to intervene in that war. One year later, Italian forces, now under Mussolini’s command, bombarded and briefly occupied the Greek Island of Corfu.
In East Asia, violence erupted in the region where the Japanese and the Russian spheres of influence collided. In March 1920 came a Bolshevik campaign of terror and torture along the River Amur. In one small Russian city, more than 700 Japanese residents were killed, the women and children too. Even the Japanese consul and his family were tortured and killed. Japan responded by dispatching troops here and there.
To many citizens of the world, these were disturbing events. But they were thought to be minor compared with the ultimate fate of the defeated Germany. If Germany could be permanently tamed, perhaps Great Wars would be no more.
It was impossible to foresee in 1918 that the armistice would be followed, 21 years later, by an even longer and deadlier war. Initially the victors, especially France and Britain, were determined to keep Germany in a state of military weakness. They soon disarmed Germany, disbanded nearly all its army, sunk its submarines and confiscated its mightiest war ships.
They took away all its colonies, including German New Guinea, which Australia claimed. They redrew Germany’s home boundaries so that its area was smaller, its population and its resources fewer. Such a series of penalties, such punishments, surely would keep Germany from ever again becoming a military threat.
How then did Germany rearm? It is now widely contended that the peace treaty imposed on Germany at the Versailles peace conference in 1919 was too harsh, thus provoking it to seize the chance to rearm and eventually retaliate.
In fact, the Treaty of Versailles had punished Germany no more harshly than the Germans had punished the defeated Russia in 1917-18. And the Allies’ punishment of Germany at the end of World War II was even harsher than that imposed after the previous war. The humiliation imposed by the Allies in 1945, after the death of Hitler, actually kept the peace decade after decade.
The immediate aftermath of war was spiced with reassuring sights that daily life in Australia would soon become normal.
But there were occasional shocks. The economy still suffered from inflation. Between 1914 and 1919 prices doubled, but people’s wages and salaries lagged far behind. Even while the great battles had raged in France, economic unrest stoked industrial troubles on the Australian coalfields, railways and wharves. In 1919, yet again, more days were lost through strikes than in any previous year. In 1920 in Western Australia a teachers’ strike disrupted family life. In Broken Hill, the miners were already engaged in a strike that lasted for a year and a half: they were called “the spuds and onion days”.
The far outback suffered heavily, because many of its biggest employers — the goldmines — had to close. The price of gold did not change during the war but the cost of mining soared. Nearly all gold towns erected a war memorial but most families whose surnames were inscribed had left the district. In the typical city, the unemployment rate was as high in the 10 years after the war than in the 10 years before.
Meanwhile, an epidemic arrived by sea. Called the Spanish flu, though perhaps a product of US military camps and deplorable conditions on the European battlefields, it created near-panic as it spread across the globe. In February 1919 the premier of NSW issued an order closing churches. He banned race meetings and shut down cinemas, libraries, auction rooms and other places where crowds might assemble.
The malady infected the ablebodied more than the old. In all, 12,000 Australians died: that was more lives than Gallipoli had snatched away.
Many of the illnesses of wartime were not initially acknowledged. Tens of thousands of returned Australians suffered from trauma. Only in the past 20 years have historians detected how numerous were those who suffered from what was called “shell shock”. When the most popular of generals, “Pompey” Elliott, died in 1931, the news that he had committed suicide was at first hidden from a public that so respected or admired him. Mental illnesses, caused by the stress of war, were not yet socially acceptable. Few doctors were capable of handling them.
It seems likely that far more soldiers were wounded physically rather than mentally. Of the 333,000 Australians who served overseas in the war, half were wounded in action or gassed. Caring for the wounded, the widows, and the orphans called for a massive increase in the postwar federal budgets.
Another uncountable loss was in talent, wasted talent. So many of those Australians who were killed in action or died prematurely in the following decade showed qualities of leadership. They would have been prime ministers, premiers, judges, leaders of the trade unions and churches, university professors and the principals of schools, poets and musicians, goahead farmers and pastoralists, surgeons and scientists, and the pacesetters in many professions and trades.
For more than a century, Australia had been a man’s land; within the adult population the women were far out-numbered. Then came World War I and the departure of an army of men for overseas war zones. For the first time since the arrival of the First Fleet, this country held more females than males. Even after the war, the scarcity of young men prevailed. In the 20s, the unmarried young woman became a reminder of the war.
After the armistice came a collision of ideas and political movements. Russia’s victorious Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 — itself one effect of the war — preached radical ideas in Australian workplaces. In 1920, the newborn local Communist Party called for the overthrow of parliaments, the police forces, army and navy.
In the following 20 years, farleft ideas gained a toehold in universities and creative writers’ groups and in some Protestant pulpits. They won a strong foothold in the trade union movement. They created divisions in the Labor Party, already divided.
The traditional tensions between Catholics and Protestants were temporarily heightened by World War I and the accompanying insurrection in Ireland.
In 1916, the thorny question of whether Australia should compel young men to fight a war in Europe began to split the Labor Party. The articulate Catholic orator, Bishop Daniel Mannix, fresh from Ireland, became the most ardent opponent of conscription. Not perhaps since the 1850s had an Australian political figure — one holding no seat in parliament — so shaped and sharpened a major public debate.
The Australian people, by a narrow majority, twice voted against their government’s proposal to conscript and compel fit men to join their fellow countrymen at the battlefields. So enormous were the number of casualties on the Western Front that Britain and New Zealand were already conscripting soldiers, but Australia refused. The refusal became part of the long-term policy of the Labor Party.
The prime minister who declared war on Mannix was Hughes, a Sydney Protestant of Welsh ancestry. As Labor’s leader he became prime minister in 1915, ardently supported the war against Germany, and believed that Australia should — come what may — send more soldiers to France in the dark days of the following year. He aroused such fierce opposition that he had to leave the Labor Party.
A wily politician, Hughes remained prime minister, thanks to the support he now received from his former non-Labor opponents. At the peace conferences in France in 1919 he made his international name, appearing as the outspoken leader from Australia and the scorner of US president Woodrow Wilson.
He, more than any other leader within the British Empire, predicted Japan would become a first-rate military power and a special danger to Australia.
An astonishing episode in 1920 was the expulsion from the federal parliament of Irish-born Hugh Mahon. An ally of Mannix, Mahon was a longstanding Labor politician from the West Australian goldfields.
Addressing a Melbourne outdoors rally in favour of independence for Ireland, he expressed the fervent wish that “the foundations of this bloody and accursed British Empire would be rocked — if God dispensed true justice”.
As a result of his rather wild and anti-British outburst he was not simply suspended from parliament but expelled, by 34 votes to
17. His seat in parliament was declared to be vacant.
The Mahon episode — ironically it was debated on Armistice Day, 1920 — was a sign of a troubled nation. Surely parliament justifies its existence partly because it serves as a vital channel for discontent. To block that channel worried many loyal citizens. After the Hughes Split, the Labor Party became more a Catholic party. In the following half-century, Labor did not often win office. In that period it produced only three prime ministers — James Scullin, John Curtin and Ben Chifley — each of whom was reared in Catholic families of Irish descent.
Perhaps we now have a tendency to exaggerate religious rivalries and tensions in old-time Australia. There it was much easier than in modern Britain and in the US for a Catholic to attain high office. While it has long been the custom to view the wartime debates and divisions that centred on conscription as primarily Protestant versus Catholic, these debates also reflected clashing viewpoints that existed inside every church.
A large and influential minority of Australians of that era acquired a distaste for war. In the next war they hoped their nation would be neutral, not taking into account that it could be neutral only if the potential enemy gave its consent. Japan in 1941 was to give no such consent.
In some ways World War I seriously hurt Australia. But that war would have been more devastating if we, like France and Belgium, Russia and Turkey and Romania, had been invaded by a foreign army. We were saved partly by our isolation, a factor that was to work against us in World War II.
We would have suffered even more severely if our sea lanes had been endangered often by enemy cruisers and submarines. Most of the European nations suffered from a shortage of food as the war went on. Even bread was rationed in many European countries. On Armistice Day in 1918, millions of Germans were close to starvation. Indeed, their nation surrendered partly because civilian morale was collapsing. Here, in contrast, there was no shortage of food.
Australia gained enormously because it was on the winning side. It is curious that the word armistice, with its peaceful connotations, can dominate our memory of the war. As a nation, we too often forget that we were victorious. Anzac Day is the nation’s abiding and commanding memory of World War I, and because Gallipoli is widely but mistakenly viewed as a disastrous defeat, we forget that the war as whole ended in a decisive victory. Most people who had a part in that victory were proud of their country, vowing it was the best in a turbulent world.
What would have happened if Australia was on the losing side?
If Germany had won the war decisively, it would have imposed a harsh peace treaty on Britain, France, Australia and other defeated nations. Germany would have demanded a huge sum in reparations, and Australia would have been a payer. Germany if victorious would have sunk or taken over the British navy and, of course, the small Australian navy. It probably would have confiscated most of the British cargo fleet, which was still the largest in the world.
Berlin, if victorious, certainly would have reclaimed German New Guinea, which had been captured by Australia in 1914. It might have annexed Papua, too, and occupied Thursday Island, thus giving it control of Torres Strait. It is likely that German banks, shipping lines and manufacturers would have acquired a leading role in our commerce.
In May 1917, when Germany’s leaders were still confident of winning the war, Kaiser Wilhelm II set down his own wish list. He would demand the vital British island of Malta in the Mediterranean; he sought Madeira and other islands in the North Atlantic as German naval bases; and he resolved that the Belgian Congo and French West Africa would become German possessions. And many strategic resources, he insisted, should be under Germany’s direct or indirect control, including Australia’s wool and Russia’s manganese.
Armistice Day is certainly a celebration of peace. It is also a celebration of victory and of all those Australians, who through bravery and determination, gave us that victory.
Geoffrey Blainey’s latest work is
The Story of Australia’s People, in two volumes
.

Saturday, November 10, 2018

Demise of the conservatives

Conservatives world over lose winning culture

Trump’s mid-term success obscures right-wing losses
What do the US mid-term elections tell us about the future of conservative politics, and the conservative cultural movement, in the US, in Britain, in Australia and in the West generally? They actually tell us a great deal, and mostly it’s pretty bad news.
But first, make no mistake. These results were a good outcome for Donald Trump. Elected by the mechanics of the electoral college with three million fewer votes than Hillary Clinton in 2016, and relentlessly attacked and vilified by everyone but conservatives ever since, Trump proved that he is neither an aberration nor an illegitimate president.
This election definitively disproves the idea that an overwhelming majority of Americans bitterly oppose Trump and all his works, and that those who did vote for him are suffering grave buyer’s remorse. Trump nationalised the elections as far as possible, made himself the centre of the debate and held Republican losses in the House of Representatives to well within the normal mid-term setback for the party in office.
Much more spectacularly, he gained several Senate seats. When there is a big anti-incumbency vote the party in power typically loses Senate seats. All of this reflects Trump’s tactical agility and effective aggression. It also reflects the fact the Republicans, much more than the Liberals in Australia or the Conservatives in Britain, are very good at the technical side of electoral politics. They get out their votes, they raise money, they leave as little as possible to chance.
But let’s try to take a couple of steps back. Trump’s tactical effectiveness and the Republicans’ technical virtuosity together tend to conceal the fact that, overall, the conservatives are losing in America and across the West.
Here is a central reality. Politics is downstream of culture. The West’s political crisis of today reflects and is caused by the antecedent cultural crisis. Whether you call them the culture wars or something else, conservatives are broadly losing the arguments about the meaning of life, the purpose of society, the manner of politics and the nature of the good life. As they lose the culture, they will surely in time lose the politics.
That doesn’t mean the Left will be forever triumphant. I have often quoted the insight of Ross Douthat: if you don’t like the religious Right, wait until you meet the non-religious Right. The sterility of the contemporary Left’s view of the human condition will lead to reaction. But that reaction may not come in the civilised tones of a Robert Menzies or a John Howard. It may have about it the tone of voice of an angry mob. It will be anger untempered by grace. It is most likely to be ultranationalist.
It is a grave mistake to demonise Trump, but there are traces of all this in Trump.
The old and previously enduring consensus of modern liberalism has broken down. On the Left it has been replaced by the febrile and insane, and ultimately destructive, doctrines of postmodernism. On the Right it is challenged by a pre-modern outlook, some of which is a retreat to tradition, some of which is an ugly indulgence of anger and an answer of minority identity politics with white identity politics.
How, specifically, do the US mid-term elections bear on this? The turnout was unusually high at 47 per cent, or about 110 million voters. In the Senate, perhaps 12 million more people voted for Democrats than for Republicans. Each state has an equal number of senators — two. So Wyoming, with fewer than 600,000, people has two senators — just like California, with 40 million people.
Rural people are more conservative than city people, so the Republicans get a lot more senators. Similarly, Democrats were defending many more “safe” Senate seats than were Republicans, so naturally their vote was higher.
However, in the House of Representatives, all 435 districts were up for election. Democrats won the popular vote by more than 7 per cent, or nearly eight million votes. Although a direct comparison is not strictly possible, to put it in its nearest Australian terms, that would mean a two-party-preferred vote for the Democrats of 53.5 per cent against 46.5 per cent for the Republicans. In Australia, this would produce a landslide for the Democrats.
The reason it doesn’t in the US is because state legislatures control federal congressional districts and fiercely gerrymander them. But in time this gerrymander will work its way out of the system.
Politics is downstream of culture. The West’s political crisis of today reflects and is caused by the antecedent cultural crisis
Australia, like the US and many Western societies, used to have a pro-rural gerrymander in its electoral system. This meant that conservatives were falsely reassured that they still had strong majority support while they had in fact lost it. In 1972 Gough Whitlam’s Labor Party won only eight seats from the Liberal-National coalition of Billy McMahon to secure a majority of 67 to 58, even though Whitlam’s Labor won 52.7 per cent of the two-party-preferred vote, a result that today would give a government a landslide.
Once British Conservatives enjoyed a similar advantage. Modern politics is wiping those old pro-rural and pro-conservative gerrymanders out of the system everywhere. Although the US Senate, like the Australian Senate, will always have a bias for small states, in time the Democratic voter majority will yield Democratic election victories.
Trump remains entirely competitive for the next presidential election in 2020, especially if the Democrats choose a left-wing candidate, but three critical midwest states that Trump won narrowly in 2016, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, all went decisively Democrat. He could not possibly win re-election without those states.
Moreover, culturally as well as politically, the Republicans dominate only one big state, Texas. They narrowly won Florida but it’s always lineball. California and New York are profoundly and pervasively Democrat. So is Illinois mostly. These long-term trends are very difficult for Republicans.
In Australia, the conservative government of Scott Morrison is by no means defeated and will certainly fight hard, but in truth it probably has a 15 to 20 per cent chance of re-election. In Britain, Jeremy Corbyn, the most leftwing Labour leader in modern British history, with a long record of supporting communists and terrorists, stands on the brink of government, supported by an even more left-wing party in the Scottish Nationalists, whose chief mission is to tear apart the United Kingdom.
A decent, conservative woman, Theresa May, daughter of the manse, devoutly Anglo-Catholic, the picture of modest personal behaviour and irreproachable decency in her own life, is a dead woman walking, who at last year’s election transformed a safe majority government into a minority government forever teetering on the edge of the abyss.
Why are conservatives losing the big arguments in the West?
There are structural and strategic reasons, and tactical reasons. Consider a few.
All over the West, the Left is dedicated and systematic in capturing institutions. This is especially evident in big universities. Conservative academics have been all but cleaned out of humanities departments in mainstream universities. In Australia we have a Monty Python satire situation in which the Ramsay Foundation cannot give away tens of millions of dollars to a public university to teach a degree in Western civilisation, because Western civilisation in the Western academy is considered to be a synonym for genocide, rape, torture, sexism, colonialism, imperialism and all the rest.
At Oxford University last year, the student body at Balliol College banned the Christian Union from participating in “freshers’ fair” because this might threaten, intimidate or “harm” students, because Christianity is associated with Western civilisation, and Western civilisation is synonymous with genocide, rape, torture, etc.
The madness of the modern Left is truly breathtaking and completely beyond parody. For may years it has been left-wing dogma that children are not harmed by divorce, that pornography does not lead to sexual crime, that violence on film and television and social media does not lead to imitative violence in the real world. And yet at the same time the Left holds that a Christian Union stall would be intimidating to freshers and that the study of Shakespeare’s Othello needs trigger warnings because of the treatment of characters of colour.
But while it is easy to lampoon this madness, conservatives have found it impossible to counter it effectively.
The US is better at the creation of conservative culture than Britain or Australia, partly because it is much more dynamic about creating new institutions. So there are many liberal arts colleges in the US that focus on the great books of Western civilisation. There is just one in Australia, Campion College, although there are a number of Protestant Bible colleges and the like in the process of transforming themselves into general higher education institutions. They don’t have the scale to challenge the Left’s cultural hegemony but they will keep the torch burning. Only in the US do such initiatives operate at scale.
Then there is the sheer technical and political incompetence of much of conservative politics. Conservatives don’t believe in identity politics and they don’t believe in quotas. This is because they have a profound, doctrinal and sound belief in the universalist principles of citizenship and indeed of humanity. Conservatives do, however, believe in diversity. But they are not very good — in fact they’re bloody awful — at practising diversity.
It was perhaps the worst mistake of the Abbott government to begin its first cabinet with one female minister. Those forces who tried valiantly to reform the offensive provisions of section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act were incompetent fools not to find, recruit and prioritise champions of this reform of Chinese and Indian and other minority backgrounds. This is the merest common sense.
Throughout Britain, the US and Australia conservatives are riven over immigration. In truth, immigration is a wholly conservative policy. Run properly, it builds up the nation, it develops the economy, it lifts living standards, it enhances national security and it gives life and meaning to the universalism at the heart of all decent conservatism.
But all conservatives are rightly opposed to illegal immigration. That is a popular position, even with most immigrants. But conservatives are often so clumsy in their arguments, and sometimes tacitly want the support of the genuinely prejudiced, that they seem often to be arguing against people on the basis of their ethnicity. Trump is particularly prone to this, even though opposing illegal immigration is sound in principle and an electoral winner.
However, this issue can provide false hope. A Republican governor of California in the 1990s, Pete Wilson, won one election by opposing Hispanic immigration. He mobilised white voters against Hispanic immigration. But he also convinced Hispanics that the Republican Party was their enemy and after he left office Republicans have never recovered in California.
Good political leadership, of course, can affect culture, both by encouraging institutions and by shaping debate.
The frightening lure of white nationalism that remains only a small minority of Trump’s support is inherently wrong in principle, against conservatism and extremely dangerous for conservatives. Because older folks are much more conservative than younger folks, winning tactical victories by appealing to mass wisdom against popular foolishness may work for a time but does not build a long-term movement.
But the real elephant in the room of conservative defeat is the decline of religious belief. Britain is already a majority atheist nation. Only 15 per cent of Brits identify as Anglicans. Only 3 per cent of 18 to 24-year-olds identify as Anglicans.
In the US, religious belief is stronger but in similar decline. In 2007, 78 per cent of Americans described themselves as Christians, while 16 per cent said they had no religious belief. Seven years later, 23 per cent had no religious belief and 70 per cent said they were Christians, a radical decline off a large base.
In Australia, in 2006, 64 per cent were Christian and 19 per cent had no belief. A decade later, only 52 per cent were Christian and 30 per cent had no religious belief.
In all three societies, it is the older cohorts who believe. Younger cohorts have a majority of nonbelievers and they are not acquiring belief as they age.
Here is a bitter truth. In the end you cannot sustain a conservative culture in the face of the collapse of transcendent belief.
Nonetheless, there are plenty of signs of hope. The best strategic approach is the Irish one: situation desperate, advance on all fronts.
Conservatives believe in diversity. But they are not very good at practising diversity